Doing some research on the notion of zetetic only to find my dear friend Pete A. Y. Gunter quoted by this gentleman. I had forgotten about this term zetetics. As I move more and more back to philosophizing through dialog with youth, it might start popping up a bit more around here. 

The term zetetic (both a noun and an adjective) was first applied to the followers of the Greek skeptical philosopher Pyrrho of Ellis (ca. 365-275 B.C.). Pyrrho urged suspension of judgement about facts, that we should “be without beliefs, disinclined to take a stand one way or another, and steadfast in this attitude” (Stough, 1969: 26 n.23). But, as Richard H. Popkin has noted, Pyrrhonism should not be confused with Academic Skepticism that stemmed from Socrates‘ statement that “All I know is that I know nothing,” the view that no knowledge can be certain. The zetetics took a more moderate position. As Popkin points out in his history of skepticism:

The Pyrrhonists considered that both the Dogmatists and the Academics asserted too much, one group saying “Something can be known,” and the other saying that “Nothing can be known.” Instead, the Pyrrhonians proposed to suspend judge merit on all questions on which there seemed to be conflicting evidence, including the question whether or not something can be known…. The Pyrrhonian sceptics tried to avoid committing themselves on any and all guestions, even as to whether their arguments were sound. Scepticism for them was an ability, or mental attitude, for opposing evidence both pro and con on any question about what was non-evident, so that one would suspend judgement on the question…. Scepticism was a cure for the disease called Dogmatism or rashness. But unlike Academic scepticism, which came to a negative conclusion from its doubts, Pyrrhonian scepticism made no such assertion, merely saying that scepticism is a purge that eliminates everything including itself. The Pyrrhonist, then, lives undogmatically, following his natural inclinations, the appearances he is aware of, and the laws and customs of his society, without ever committing himself toany judgement about them. [Popkin, 1979: xv]

Like a proper zetetic, I remain uncertain about the ultimate correctness of this perspective, but as a working scientist, I find its practical function in avoiding dogmatism is most valuable. That is, this orientation is heuristic in that it emphasizes questions rather than answers. It fits the aims of what Gunter (1980) has called “Story Book” science (if not that actually practiced) while it avoids mistaking the goals of scientific method with science’s current substantive content. But perhaps most important of all, I find this form of skepticism congruent with the fallabilism of modern philosophies of science and with the injunction of Charles Sanders Pierce that the foremost duty of the philosopher-scientist is to do nothing that might block inquiry (Pierce, 1966: 56).

via Zetetic Ruminations on Skepticism and Anomalies in Science.